

Hash Functions


EJ Jung



> Assignment 1 is up

- reading assignment via email
- due on Sep. 27
- Google group is up
- Step 2 grades are in





(c) Modification of messages




Integrity: attacker cannot tamper with message

> Encryption may not guarantee integrity!

- Intuition: attacker may able to modify message under encryption without learning what it is
 - Given one-time key K, encrypt M as M⊕K... Perfect secrecy, but can easily change M under encryption to M⊕M' for any M'
 - Online auction: halve competitor's bid without learning its value
- This is recognized by industry standards (e.g., PKCS)
 - "RSA encryption is intended primarily to provide confidentiality... It is not intended to provide integrity"
- Many encryption schemes provide secrecy AND integrity





Software manufacturer wants to ensure that the executable file

is received by users without modification...

Sends out the file to users and publishes its hash in NY Times The goal is <u>integrity</u>, not confidentiality

Idea: given goodFile and hash(goodFile), very hard to find badFile such that hash(goodFile)=hash(badFile)



Cookie

- H(server's secret, client's unique information, timestamp)
- Password storage
 - safe against server problems



- Purpose of the HASH function is to produce a "fingerprint".
- But, what do you mean by fingerprint??



Properties of a HASH function H :

- 1. H can be applied to a block of data at any size
- 2. H produces a fixed length output
- 3. H(x) is easy to compute for any given x.
- 4. For any given block x, it is computationally infeasible to find x such that H(x) = h
- 5. For any given block x, it is computationally infeasible to find $y \neq x$ with H(y) = H(x).
- 6. It is computationally infeasible to find any pair (x, y) such that H(x) = H(y)




	bit 1	bit 2	• • •	bit n
block 1	b_{11}	<i>b</i> ₂₁		b _{n1}
block 2	<i>b</i> ₁₂	<i>b</i> ₂₂		b _{n2}
	•	•	•	•
	•	•	•	•
	•	•	•	•
block m	b_{1m}	b_{2m}		b _{nm}
hash code	<i>C</i> ₁	<i>C</i> ₂		C _n

Figure 3.3 Simple Hash Function Using Bitwise XOR







> H is a lossy compression function

- Collisions: h(x)=h(x') for some inputs x, x'
- Result of hashing should "look random" (make this precise later)
 - Intuition: half of digest bits are "1"; any bit in digest is "1" half the time

Cryptographic hash function needs a few properties...



Intuition: hash should be hard to invert

- "Preimage resistance"
- Let $h(x')=y \in \{0,1\}^n$ for a random x'
- Given y, it should be hard to find any x such that h(x)
 =y

How hard?

- Brute-force: try every possible x, see if h(x)=y
- SHA-1 (common hash function) has 160-bit output
 - Suppose have hardware that' II do 2³⁰ trials a pop
 - Assuming 2³⁴ trials per second, can do 2⁸⁹ trials per year
 - Will take 2⁷¹ years to invert SHA-1 on a random image



T people

- Suppose each birthday is a random number taken from K days (K=365) – how many possibilities?
 - K^T (samples with replacement)
- > How many possibilities that are all different?
 - $(K)_T = K(K-1)...(K-T+1)$ samples without replacement
- Probability of no repetition?
 - $(K)_T/K^T \approx 1 T(T-1)/2K$
- Probability of repetition?
 - O(T²)



- > Should be hard to find x, x' such that h(x)=h(x')
- > Brute-force collision search is $O(2^{n/2})$, <u>not</u> $O(2^n)$
 - n = number of bits in the output of hash function
 - For SHA-1, this means O(2⁸⁰) vs. O(2¹⁶⁰)
- > Reason: birthday paradox
 - Let T be the number of values x,x',x''... we need to look at before finding the first pair x,x' s.t. h(x)=h(x')
 - Assuming h is random, what is the probability that we find a repetition after looking at T values? O(T²)
 - Total number of pairs? O(2ⁿ)
 - Conclusion: $T \approx O(2^{n/2})$



One-Way vs. Collision Resistance

> One-wayness does <u>not</u> imply collision resistance

- Suppose g is one-way
- Define h(x) as g(x') where x' is x except the last bit
 - h is one-way (to invert h, must invert g)
 - Collisions for h are easy to find: for any x, h(x0)=h(x1)

Collision resistance does not imply one-wayness

- Suppose g is collision-resistant
- Define h(x) to be 0x if x is n-bit long, 1g(x) otherwise
 - Collisions for h are hard to find: if y starts with 0, then there are no collisions, if y starts with 1, then must find collisions in g
 - h is not one way: half of all y's (those whose first bit is 0) are easy to invert (how?); random y is invertible with probab. 1/2



- Given randomly chosen x, hard to find x' such that h(x)=h(x')
 - Attacker must find collision for a <u>specific</u> x. By contrast, to break collision resistance, enough to find <u>any</u> collision.
 - Brute-force attack requires O(2ⁿ) time
- Weak collision resistance does <u>not</u> imply collision resistance (why?)



UNIX passwords stored as hash(password)

• One-wayness: hard to recover password

Integrity of software distribution

- Weak collision resistance
- But software images are not really random... maybe need full collision resistance

Auction bidding


- Alice wants to bid B, sends H(B), later reveals B
- One-wayness: rival bidders should not recover B
- Collision resistance: Alice should not be able to change her mind to bid B' such that H(B)=H(B')



> MD5

- 128-bit output
- Still used very widely
- Completely broken by now
- > RIPEMD-160
 - 160-bit variant of MD-5
- SHA-1 (Secure Hash Algorithm)
 - 160-bit output
 - US government (NIST) standard as of 1993-95
 - Also the hash algorithm for Digital Signature Standard (DSS)







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Block Ciphers




repeat for several rounds




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slide 21








> Every bit of output depends on every bit of input

- Very important property for collision-resistance
- Brute-force inversion requires 2¹⁶⁰ ops, birthday attack on collision resistance requires 2⁸⁰ ops
- Some recent weaknesses (2005)
 - Collisions can be found in 2⁶³ ops





+ = word-by-word addition mod 2⁶⁴

Figure 3.4 Message Digest Generation Using SHA-512







Figure 3.5 SHA-512 Processing of a Single 1024-Bit Block




Authenticity is identification and assurance of origin of information

• We'll see many specific examples in different scenarios



Authentication with Shared




Alice wants to ensure that nobody modifies message in transit (both integrity and authentication)

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Idea: given msg,
very hard to compute H(SECRET, msg) without SECRET;
easy with SECRET
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Authentication Without Encryption

lepartment of computer science



Integrity and authentication: only someone who knows KEY can compute MAC for a given message



- Construct MAC by applying a cryptographic hash function to message and key
 - Could also use encryption instead of hashing, but...
 - Hashing is faster than encryption in software
 - Library code for hash functions widely available
 - Can easily replace one hash function with another
 - There used to be US export restrictions on encryption
- Invented by Bellare, Canetti, and Krawczyk (1996)
- > Mandatory for IP security, also used in SSL/TLS



