

Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)

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
Advantages of Public-Key Crypto

- Confidentiality without shared secrets
 - Very useful in open environments
 - No “chicken-and-egg” key establishment problem
 - With symmetric crypto, two parties must share a secret before they can exchange secret messages
- Authentication without shared secrets
 - Use digital signatures to prove the origin of messages
- Reduce protection of information to protection of authenticity of public keys
 - No need to keep public keys secret, but must be sure that Alice’s public key is really her true public key


Disadvantages of Public-Key Crypto

- Calculations are 2-3 orders of magnitude slower
 - Modular exponentiation is an expensive computation
 - Typical usage: use public-key cryptography to establish a shared secret, then switch to symmetric crypto
 - We'll see this in IPsec and SSL
- Keys are longer
 - 1024 bits (RSA) rather than 128 bits (AES)
- Relies on unproven number-theoretic assumptions
 - What if factoring is easy?
 - Factoring is believed to be neither P, nor NP-complete

Encryption using Public-Key system




Authentication using Public-Key System



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Authenticity of Public Keys




Problem: How does Alice know that the public key she received is really Bob's public key?


Distribution of Public Keys

- Public announcement or public directory
 - Risks: forgery and tampering
- Public-key certificate
 - Signed statement specifying the key and identity
 - $\text{sig}_{\text{Alice}}(\text{"Bob"}, \text{PK}_B)$
- Common approach: certificate authority (CA)
 - Single agency responsible for certifying public keys
 - After generating a private/public key pair, user proves his identity and knowledge of the private key to obtain CA's certificate for the public key (offline)
 - Every computer is pre-configured with CA's public key

Using Public-Key Certificates



Typical Digital Signature Approach



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Hierarchical Approach

- Single CA certifying every public key is impractical
- Instead, use a trusted **root authority**
 - For example, Verisign
 - Everybody must know the public key for verifying root authority's signatures
- Root authority signs certificates for lower-level authorities, lower-level authorities sign certificates for individual networks, and so on
 - Instead of a single certificate, use a **certificate chain**
 - $\text{sig}_{\text{Verisign}}(\text{"UI"}, \text{PK}_{\text{UI}}), \text{sig}_{\text{UI}}(\text{"EJ Jung"}, \text{PK}_{\text{E}})$
 - What happens if root authority is ever compromised?

Revocation of Certificates


➤ Reasons for revocation:

- The user's secret key is assumed to be compromised.
- The user is no longer certified by this CA.
- The CA's certificate is assumed to be compromised.

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X.509 CA Hierarchy



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Alternative: "Web of Trust"

- Used in PGP (Pretty Good Privacy)
- Instead of a single root certificate authority, each person has a set of keys they "trust"
 - If public-key certificate is signed by one of the "trusted" keys, the public key contained in it will be deemed valid
- Trust can be transitive
 - Can use certified keys for further certification

