


### **Cookies and Passwords**

Vitaly Shmatikov modified by EJ Jung

slide 1

# Browser and Network



# HTTP: HyperText Transfer Protocol

#### Used to request and return data

• Methods: GET, POST, HEAD, ...


#### Stateless request/response protocol


- Each request is independent of previous requests
- Statelessness has a significant impact on design and implementation of applications

#### Evolution


- HTTP 1.0: simple
- HTTP 1.1: more complex









## HTTP Digest Authentication





Store session information in URL; easily read on network



# Examples of Weak Authenticators

#### Verizon Wireless: counter

- User logs in, gets counter, can view sessions of other users
- > Apache Tomcat: generateSessionID()
  - MD5(PRNG) ... but weak PRNG
    - PRNG = pseudo-random number generator
  - Result: predictable SessionID's

# Bad Idea: Encoding State in

- > Unstable, frequently changing URLs
- Vulnerable to eavesdropping
- > There is no guarantee that URL is private
  - Early versions of Opera used to send entire browsing history, including all visited URLs, to Google






slide 11

# Usics Storing Info Across Sessions

A cookie is a file created by a website to store information in your browser



HTTP is a stateless protocol; cookies add state

# What Are Cookies Used For?

#### Authentication

• Use the fact that the user authenticated correctly in the past to make future authentication quicker

#### Personalization

• Recognize the user from a previous visit

#### Tracking

• Follow the user from site to site; learn his/her browsing behavior, preferences, and so on



#### Cookie ownership

- Once a cookie is saved on your computer, only the website that created the cookie can read it
  - If cookie is "secure", browser will only send it over HTTPS
  - ... but anyone can <u>write</u> a secure cookie!

#### Variations

- Temporary cookies: stored until you quit your browser
- Persistent cookies: remain until deleted or expire
- Third-party cookies: originate on or sent to another website

## Privacy Issues with Cookies

Cookie may include any information about you known by the website that created it

• Browsing activity, account information, etc.

#### Sites can share this information

- Advertising networks
- 207.net tracking cookie

#### Browser attacks could invade your "privacy"


#### November 8, 2001:

Users of Microsoft's browser and e-mail programs could be vulnerable to having their browser cookies stolen or modified due to a new security bug in Internet Explorer (IE), the company warned today






# The Weather Channel







## usics Let's Take a Closer Look...

your	website "insightexpressai.com" has requested to save a file on computer called a "cookie." This file may be used to track je information. Do you want to allow this?		
Apply my decision to all cookies from this website			
	Allow Cookie Block Cookie More Info Help		
Name	IXAICampaignCounter558		
Domain	insightexpressai.com		
Path			
Expires	Thursday, December 31, 2020 5:00:00 Secure No		
Data			
	~		
3rd Party	Yes Session No		
Compact Policy	CP="OTI DSP COR CUR ADMI DEVI TAI PSA PSD IVD CONI TELI OUR BUS STA"		
	Cookie Info Name Domain Path Expires Data 3rd Pany Compact		

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### usics Storing State in Browser

#### Dansie Shopping Cart (2006)

• "A premium, comprehensive, Perl shopping cart. Increase your web sales by making it easier for your web store customers to order."

```
<FORM METHOD=POST
```

ACTION="http://www.dansie.net/cgi-bin/scripts/cart.pl">

Black Leather purse with leather straps< Change this to 2.00

<INPUT TYPE=HIDDEN NAME=name VALUE="Plack leather purse"> VALUE="Plack leather purse"</plack leather purse"> VALUE="Plack leather pu <INPUT TYPE=HIDDEN NAME=sh VALUE=""" <INPUT TYPE=HIDDEN NAME=img VALUE=""F Bargain shopping! with leather straps">

<INPUT TYPE=SUBMIT NAME="add" VALUE="Put in Shopping Cart">

</FORM>

# Shopping Cart Form Tampering

http://xforce.iss.net/xforce/xfdb/4621

Many Web-based shopping cart applications use hidden fields in HTML forms to hold parameters for items in an online store. These parameters can include the item's name, weight, quantity, product ID, and price. Any application that bases price on a hidden field in an HTML form is vulnerable to price changing by a remote user. A remote user can change the price of a particular item they intend to buy, by changing the value for the hidden HTML tag that specifies the price, to purchase products at any price they choose.

#### Platforms Affected:

- 3D3.COM Pty Ltd: ShopFactory 5.8 and earlier
- Adgrafix: Check It Out Any version
- ComCity Corporation: SalesCart Any version
- Dansie.net: Dansie Shopping Cart Any version
- Make-a-Store: Make-a-Store OrderPage Any version
- McMurtrey/Whitaker & Associates: Cart32 3.0
- Rich Media Technologies: JustAddCommerce 5.0
- Web Express: Shoptron 1.2

@Retail Corporation: @Retail Any version Baron Consulting Group: WebSite Tool Any version Crested Butte Software: EasyCart Any version Intelligent Vending Systems: Intellivend Any version McMurtrey/Whitaker & Associates: Cart32 2.6 pknutsen@nethut.no: CartMan 1.04 SmartCart: SmartCart Any version

slide 21



[From "The Art of Intrusion"]

- Estonian bank's web server
- HTML source reveals a hidden variable that points to a file name
- Change file name to password file
- > Webserver displays contents of password file
  - Bank was not using shadow password files!
- Standard cracking program took 15 minutes to crack root password

# Storing State in Browser

- Set-cookie: price=299.99
- User edits the cookie... cookie: price=29.99
- > What's the solution?
- Add a MAC to every cookie, computed with the server's secret key
  - Price=299.99; HMAC(ServerKey, 299.99)
- > But what if the website changes the price?


slide 23

# Web Authentication via

Need authentication system that works over HTTP and does not require servers to store session data

- Why is it a bad idea to store session state on server?
- Servers can use cookies to store state on client
  - After client successfully authenticates, server computes an authenticator and gives it to browser in a cookie
    - Client cannot forge authenticator on his own
    - Example: hash(server's secret key, session id)
  - With each request, browser presents the cookie
  - Server recomputes and verifies the authenticator – Server does not need to remember the authenticator

# Typical Session with Cookies



#### Authenticators must be unforgeable and tamper-proof

(malicious client shouldn't be able to compute his own or modify an existing authenticator)

slide 25



• [Fu et al.] •

Idea: use user,hash(user,key) as authenticator


- Key is secret and known only to the server. Without the key, clients can't forge authenticators.
- Implementation: user,crypt(user,key)
  - crypt() is UNIX hash function for passwords
  - crypt() truncates its input at 8 characters
  - Usernames matching first 8 characters end up with the same authenticator
  - No expiration or revocation
- It gets worse... This scheme can be exploited to extract the server's secret key

UNIVERSITY of SAN FRANCISCO department of computer science				
username	crypt(username,key,"00	0") authenticator cookie		
VitalySh1	008H8LRfzUXvk	VitalySh1008H8LRfzUXvk		
VitalySh2	008H8LRfzUXvk	VitalySh2008H8LRfzUXvk		
Cre	ate an account with a	a 7-letter user name		
VitalySA	0073UYEre5rBQ	Try logging in: access refused		
VitalyS <mark>B</mark>	00bkHcfOXBKno	Access refused		
VitalySC	00ofSJV6An1QE	Login successful! 1 <sup>st</sup> key symbol is		
	Now a 6-letter user i	name		
Vitaly CA	001mBnBErXRuc	Access refused		
Vitaly <mark>CB</mark>	00T3JLLfuspdo	Access refused and so on		
	od 128 v 8 queries ins	tead of intended $128^8$		


- Only need 128 x 8 queries instead of intended 128<sup>8</sup>
- 17 minutes with a simple Perl script vs. 2 billion years

slide 27


## Better Cookie Authenticator



- Main lesson: don't roll your own!
  - Homebrewed authentication schemes are often flawed
- There are standard cookie-based schemes









- Instead of user password, store H(password)
- When user enters password, compute its hash and compare with entry in password file
  - System does not store actual passwords!
- > Hash function H must have some properties
  - One-way: given H(password), hard to find password
    No known algorithm better than trial and error
  - Collision-resistant: given H(password1), hard to find password2 such that H(password1)=H(password2)
    - It should even be hard to find any pair  $p_{1,p_2}$  s.t.  $H(p_1)=H(p_2)$



> Uses DES encryption as if it were a hash function


- Encrypt NULL string using password as the key – Truncates passwords to 8 characters!
- Artificial slowdown: run DES 25 times
- Can instruct modern UNIXes to use MD5 hash function
- Problem: passwords are not truly random
  - With 52 upper- and lower-case letters, 10 digits and 32 punctuation symbols, there are  $94^8 \approx 6$  quadrillion possible 8-character passwords
  - Humans like to use dictionary words, human and pet names  $\approx 1$  million common passwords



#### Password file /etc/passwd is world-readable

- Contains user IDs and group IDs which are used by many system programs
- Dictionary attack is possible because many passwords come from a small dictionary
  - Attacker can compute H(word) for every word in the dictionary and see if the result is in the password file
  - With 1,000,000-word dictionary and assuming 10 guesses per second, brute-force online attack takes 50,000 seconds (14 hours) on average
    - This is very conservative. Offline attack is much faster!






- in the password file
- Dictionary attack is still possible!

# Advantages of Salting

- Without salt, attacker can pre-compute hashes of all dictionary words once for <u>all</u> password entries
  - Same hash function on all UNIX machines
  - Identical passwords hash to identical values; one table of hash values can be used for all password files
- With salt, attacker must compute hashes of all dictionary words once for <u>each</u> password entry
  - With 12-bit random salt, same password can hash to 2<sup>12</sup> different hash values
  - Attacker must try all dictionary words for each salt value in the password file





Hashed password is not stored in a world-readable file

/etc/passwd entry

- Store hashed passwords in /etc/shadow file which is only readable by system administrator (root)
- Add expiration dates for passwords
- Early Shadow implementations on Linux called the login program which had a buffer overflow!