

IPSec

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Service lab progress report due today


• submit through Assignment in Blackboard

> Lab 2 report due on Friday, Nov. 12

• submit through Assignment in Blackboard










Eavesdropping

> Modification of packets in transit

- > Identity spoofing (forged source IP addresses)
- Denial of service
- > Many solutions are application-specific
 - TLS for Web, S/MIME for email, SSH for remote login
- IPSec aims to provide a framework of open standards for secure communications over IP
 - Protect every protocol running on top of IPv4 and IPv6





AH and ESP rely on an existing security association

Idea: parties must share a set of secret keys and agree on each other's IP addresses and crypto algorithms

Internet Key Exchange (IKE)

Goal: establish security association for AH and ESP If IKE is broken, AH and ESP provide no protection!



> Authentication and integrity for packet sources

• Ensures connectionless integrity (for a single packet) and partial sequence integrity (prevent packet replay)

Confidentiality (encapsulation) for packet contents

- Also partial protection against traffic analysis
- Authentication and encapsulation can be used separately or together
- > Either provided in one of two modes
- These services are transparent to applications above transport (TCP/UDP) layer



Transport mode

- Used to deliver services from host to host or from host to gateway
- Usually within the same network, but can also be end-to-end across networks

Tunnel mode

- Used to deliver services from gateway to gateway or from host to gateway
- Usually gateways owned by the same organization
 - With an insecure network in the middle




Transport mode secures packet payload and leaves IP header unchanged

IP header (real dest)	IPSec header	TCP/UDP header + data
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Tunnel mode encapsulates both IP header and payload into IPSec packets

IP header	IP header
(gateway) IPSec head	(real dest) TCP/UDP header + data






End-to-end security between two hosts

- Typically, client to gateway (e.g., PC to remote host)
- > Requires IPSec support at each host





Gateway-to-gateway security

- Internal traffic behind gateways not protected
- Typical application: virtual private network (VPN)
- > Only requires IPSec support at gateways



> One-way sender-recipient relationship

> SA determines how packets are processed

- Cryptographic algorithms, keys, IVs, lifetimes, sequence numbers, mode (transport or tunnel)
- SA is uniquely identified by SPI (Security Parameters Index)...
 - Each IPSec keeps a database of SAs
 - SPI is sent with packet, tells recipient which SA to use
- …destination IP address, and
- > ...protocol identifier (AH or ESP)



- Each IPSec connection is viewed as one-way so two SAs required for a two-way conversation
 - Hence need for Security Parameter Index
- Security association (SA) defines
 - Protocol used (AH, ESP)
 - Mode (transport, tunnel)
 - Encryption or hashing algorithm to be used
 - Negotiated keys and key lifetimes
 - Lifetime of this SA
 - ... plus other info




How is SA established?

• How do parties negotiate a common set of cryptographic algorithms and keys to use?

> More than one SA can apply to a packet!

• E.g., end-to-end authentication (AH) and additional encryption (ESP) on the public part of the network



* = implements IPSec


Figure 6.10 Basic Combinations of Security Associations



Sender authentication

- > Integrity for packet contents and IP header
- > Sender and receiver must share a <u>secret key</u>
 - This key is used in HMAC computation
 - The key is set up by IKE key establishment protocol and recorded in the Security Association (SA)
 - SA also records protocol being used (AH) and mode (transport or tunnel) plus hashing algorithm used
 - MD5 or SHA-1 supported as hashing algorithms






(c) Using secret value


Figure 3.2 Message Authentication Using a One-Way Hash Function



HMAC for AH Authentication (RFC 2104)










AH sets mutable fields to zero and predictable fields to final value and then uses this header plus packet contents as input to HMAC




















Provides integrity and sender authentication
Authenticates portions of the IP header
Anti-replay service (to counter denial of service)
No confidentiality





- When SA is established, sender initializes 32-bit counter to 0, increments by 1 for each packet
 - If wraps around 2³²-1, new SA must be established
- Recipient maintains a sliding 64-bit window
 - If a packet with high sequence number is received, do not advance window until packet is authenticated



UNIVERSITY of Son P: Encapsulating Security Payload

>Adds new header and trailer fields to packet

Transport mode

- Confidentiality of packet between two hosts
- Complete hole through firewalls
- Used sparingly

Tunnel mode

- Confidentiality of packet between two gateways or a host and a gateway
- Implements VPN tunnels




Confidentiality and integrity for packet payload


- Symmetric cipher negotiated as part of security assoc
- Optionally provides authentication (similar to AH)

Can work in transport...

encrypted









ESP is often used to implement a VPN

- Packets go from internal network to a gateway with TCP / IP headers for address in another network
- Entire packet hidden by encryption
 - Including original headers so destination addresses are hidden
- Receiving gateway decrypts packet and forwards original IP packet to receiving address in the network that it protects
- This is known as a VPN tunnel
 - Secure communication between parts of the same organization over public untrusted Internet



AH and ESP are often combined

End-to-end AH in transport mode

• Authenticate packet sources

Gateway-to-gateway ESP in tunnel mode

- Hide packet contents and addresses on the insecure part of the network
- Significant cryptographic overhead
 - Even with AH

